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THE MARKET FOR ODIOUS DEBT
CAROLINE M. GENTILE*
I
INTRODUCTION
For over one hundred years, political leaders, financiers, lawyers, and
scholars in the fields of international law and international finance have
struggled to develop an effective means for sovereign debtors to repudiate their
odious debts. Despite their efforts, these debts—incurred by a dictatorial
regime for its own benefit with the knowledge of the creditors, but without the
consent of the nation’s citizens—are transferred to new governments. As a
result, the citizenry suffers two harms: the first under the dictator’s brutal rule,
and the second under the new government’s severe macroeconomic policies
engendered by the need to repay the debts the dictator incurred to finance his
reign.
The resurgence of efforts to incorporate a concept of illegitimacy into
sovereign debt restructurings is one of the most salient developments in the
modern legal history of sovereign debt. In a few instances, governments have
claimed that the country’s existing debt is unlawful and so need not be repaid.
For example, Rafael Correa, the President of Ecuador, established the Public
Debt Audit Commission in July of 2007 to investigate the legitimacy of the
debts the country incurred during the thirty-year period from 1976 through
2006.1 The Commission issued its report in November of 2008, concluding that
two series of bonds issued in 2000,2 the global bonds maturing in 2012 and the
global bonds maturing in 2030, were unlawful.3 The Commission thus
recommended that Ecuador refuse to make payments on these bonds.4 The next
month, Mr. Correa denounced these bonds as “illegitimate,” reportedly arguing
that “they were improperly authorised by previous administrations and
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1. Wade Mansell & Karen Openshaw, Suturing the Open Veins of Ecuador: Debt, Default and
Democracy, 2 L. & DEV. REV. 151, 153 (2009).
2. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2009, at 22,
23 [hereinafter Coroner’s Inquest].
3. Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 168.
4. Naomi Mapstone & David Oakley, Ecuador Hints at Default over “Illegitimate” Debt, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at 26.
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involved onerous interest rates, commissions and prepayments.”5 On April 20,
2009, Ecuador completed a restructuring of these bonds, repurchasing them at a
price of thirty-five cents on the dollar.6
Yet, governments are reluctant to invoke the doctrine of odious debt.7
Moreover, upon invoking the doctrine, governments are hesitant to pursue
application of the doctrine.8 While the subject of intense debate in the political
sphere and the academy, the doctrine of odious debt has never been used in an
international tribunal.9 To invoke it in support of the repudiation of sovereign
debts would, in the absence of acquiescence from creditors, expose a new
government to severely negative economic consequences. Assets located
outside the country’s borders could be seized as payments on the debts. The
new government would be seen as repudiating valid debts and so would be
unlikely to attract needed direct foreign investments or to secure needed
extensions of credit.
Thus, the bulk of the recent work concerning the doctrine of odious debt has
been devoted to adapting the doctrine to serve as a means of constraining the
incentives of creditors to make loans to dictators. For example, scholars have
proposed assigning the responsibility of determining which regimes (not debts)
are odious to an international authoritative body.10 Upon the designation of a
regime as odious, creditors would be apprised that any loans made to the
regime would be illegitimate and so nontransferable to a new government. The
reduction in the likelihood of repayment would curtail the benefits of extending
credit to the regime, making creditors less willing to do so.
Other scholars have worked to develop mechanisms for declaring sovereign
debts to be odious and thus unenforceable while the dictatorial regime is in
power, rather than upon the regime’s overthrow and the emergence of a new
government. These tools include charging an international tribunal, upon the
petition of enumerated parties, with the enforcement of the core principles of
the doctrine11 and embedding specified elements of the doctrine into the

5. Naomi Mapstone, Ecuador Maintains Bond Default Threat, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008 (on file
with author).
6. Coroner’s Inquest, supra note 2, at 25; Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 177–78.
7. The new democratic government of South Africa, for example, continues to service the debt
incurred under the Apartheid Regime. See Joseph Hanlon, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When
Creditors Should Be Liable for Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109, 121–
23 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006).
8. President Correa has refrained from repudiating the sovereign bonds he regards as illegitimate,
preferring to use references to the odious debt doctrine as a tool in restructuring the global bonds. See
Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 180–81.
9. Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts?, 32
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 749 (2006) (arguing that a legal doctrine of odious debt does not exist).
10. See generally Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Autumn 2007); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 82 (2006).
11. Christoph G. Paulus, “Odious Debt” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
83, 101–02 (2005).
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contracts governing loans to sovereigns, thereby placing the responsibility for
identifying odious debts on creditors.12 The risk that a sovereign debt may be
determined to be odious, and therefore subject to repudiation, increases the
costs of extending credit to dictators, accordingly reducing the likelihood that
creditors will make loans to despotic rulers.
Finally, many scholars have investigated the applicability of principles of
private (domestic) law to sovereign debts. In particular, they examine the extent
to which common-law principles of contract, tort, and lender liability—as well
as fundamental principles of insolvency—might provide an effective defense for
a new government that is sued for failure to make payments on an odious debt
incurred during the prior reign of a despot.13 The greater expenses of lending
created by the risk that a new government might successfully repudiate the
debts of a deposed dictator limit the incentives of creditors to make loans to
despots.
Each of these proposals, however, lacks a consideration of the structural
features of the international financial architecture. The failure to consider the
various types of creditors—governments, international financial institutions,
and private lenders, comprising both commercial banks and holders of
sovereign bonds—and the conditions under which each of these entities makes
and enforces loans to sovereign debtors, limits the applicability of the proposals.
To address this concern, part II begins with an overview of the development
of the doctrine of odious debt, focusing first on the contours of the initial
formulations of the doctrine and then turning to the details of the recent
adaptations. In part III, the characteristics of each type of sovereign debt are
described, and the motives of each type of creditor in making loans to sovereign
debtors are delineated. Part IV offers an alternative proposal for constraining
the credit available to dictators. The focal point of the analysis is sovereign
bonds, for these investors have the strongest motives for enforcing the terms of
the agreements governing their bonds. In particular, these agreements should
incorporate modifications to the terms identifying the uses of proceeds from
both the issuance of the sovereign bonds and other incurrences of indebtedness.
These modifications will permit the sovereign bondholders to accelerate the
amounts owed to them in the event the sovereign debtor incurs odious debts.

12. See generally Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727
(2007) [hereinafter Feibelman, Contract].
13. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of
Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007) (examining the use of common-law principles of contract as
defenses against the payment of odious debts); Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious
Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Autumn 2007) (examining the use of common-law principles
of tort to achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debts); Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination,
Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Autumn 2007) (examining
the use of common-law principles of lender liability as defenses against the payment of odious debts);
A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the
Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 2007) (examining the use of fundamental principles
of insolvency to achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debts).

GENTILE

154

1/11/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:151

II
THE NATURE OF ODIOUS DEBT
A. Development of the Doctrine of Odious Debt
Following the end of hostilities in the Spanish–American War of 1898,
representatives of Spain and the United States met in Paris to negotiate the
terms of the peace treaty between the two belligerent nations. A central point
of contention was the repayment of loans that Spain had incurred to finance its
operations in Cuba and for which it had pledged Cuban revenues.14 These loans
were the result of a series of bonds the Spanish government had issued during
the 1880s.15 The bonds, which were held by citizens of a number of nations
including Belgium and Spain, were consolidated in 1886 when the Kingdom of
Spain issued a royal decree pursuant to which it borrowed funds to repay the
bonds and pledged security to guarantee repayment:
[i]n order to satisfy the interest and the redemption of the [loans], there shall be
consigned every year in the Budget of the Island of Cuba the necessary amounts for
these costs . . . . The [loans] shall have the special guarantee of the receipts of the
Customs, the Seal, and the stamp office, of the Island of Cuba, the direct and indirect
taxes existing in the Island, or which may be established there in the future, and the
16
general guarantee of the Spanish nation.

At the Paris Conference, the Spanish commissioner proposed that, in
transferring sovereignty over Cuba to the United States, Spain would transfer
“all charges and obligations of every kind . . . which the Crown of Spain . . . may
have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty . . . relinquished and
transferred, and which as such constitute an integral part thereof.”17 In support
of this proposal, the Spanish Commissioner argued, in part, that
[i]t would be contrary to the most elementary notions of justice and inconsistent with
the dictates of the universal conscience of mankind for a sovereign to lose all his rights
over a territory and the inhabitants thereof, and despite this to continue to be bound
by the obligations he had contracted exclusively for their régime and government.
These maxims seem to be observed by all cultured nations that are unwilling to
18
trample upon the eternal principles of justice . . . .

In response, the American commissioner argued that the debts were
“created by the Government of Spain, for its own purposes . . . in whose

14. See ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 329–43 (1931).
15. Id. at 332–34.
16. Id. at 332–33.
17. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (1906) (quoting the
Spanish commissioners’ Oct. 7, 1898, counter proposal to the American commissioners’ proposal of
October 3, 1898, in the peace negotiations at the Paris Conference, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 28, 33–34,
44–45 (3d Sess. 1898)).
18. Id. at 353 (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 41–
44 (3d Sess. 1898)).
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creation Cuba had no voice.”19 The American commissioner further argued that
“[f]rom no point of view can the debts . . . be considered . . . for the benefit of
Cuba.”20 Moreover, a portion of the proceeds of the loans had been spent to
suppress the rebellions in Cuba.21 Finally, the American commissioner asserted
that the creditors were aware that the loans were made and that the pledge of
Cuban revenues as security was given in the context of Spanish efforts to
suppress the struggles of the Cuban people for independence from Spanish rule.
As a result, these creditors “took the obvious chances of their investment on so
precarious a security.”22 In this way, the American commissioner based the
repudiation of the debts on three principles: (1) the debts were not incurred
with the consent of the people of Cuba, (2) the debts did not benefit the Cuban
people, and (3) the holders of the debts were aware of the lack of consent and
the lack of benefit. These reasons, taken together, have often been regarded as
an early expression of the doctrine of odious debt.
The earliest (and only) application of these principles in the judicial context
involved an arbitral decision to resolve a dispute between Great Britain and
Costa Rica regarding the repayment of two loans following the fall of the
Tinoco Regime. These loans were made pursuant to a line of credit established
in July of 1919 at the Royal Bank of Canada for the benefit of the government
of Costa Rica.23 In drawing upon this account, Frederico Tinoco received
$100,000 “for expenses of representation of the Chief of State in his
approaching trip abroad,”24 and his brother, Jose Joaquin Tinoco, received
$100,000 “as Minister of Costa Rica to Italy, for four years’ salary and expenses
of the Legation . . . in Italy.”25
In seeking repayment of these loans, representatives of Great Britain
argued that the new government of Costa Rica, as the successor to the Tinoco
Regime, was bound to honor the loans extended by the Royal Bank of
Canada.26 Representatives of this new government, however, denied the validity
of the loans (as well as all other sums owed under the line of credit), citing the
Law of Nullities, which the new government enacted to invalidate all contracts
between the executive power and private persons made during the Tinoco

19. Id. at 358 (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 48–
50 (3d Sess. 1898)).
20. Id. (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 48–50 (3d
Sess. 1898)).
21. Id. at 359.
22. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 14, at 341.
23. SABINE MICHALOWSKI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF SOVEREIGN
DEBT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (2007).
24. Tinoco (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 371, 393–94 (1923) (quoting books of the
Government of Costa Rica entry No. 1546 F July 17, 1919).
25. Id. at 394 (quoting books of the Government of Costa Rica entry No. 1546 F July 17, 1919).
26. Id. at 377.
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Regime on the basis that the regime was neither the de facto nor the de jure
government of Costa Rica.27
In reaching his decision, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard
Taft, the sole arbitrator in the case, first held that under general principles of
international law, a change of government has no effect upon the international
obligations of the state.28 Chief Justice Taft also held that the Tinoco Regime
was the de facto government of Costa Rica from January of 1917 through
September of 1919, because President Tinoco governed the nation with the
acquiescence of the people of Costa Rica, and his regime was recognized by
several nations.29
Yet Chief Justice Taft declined to require Costa Rica to repay the loans. In
reaching this decision, he stated:
It is evident from the exhibits that in the spring of 1919 the popularity of the Tinoco
[R]égime had disappeared, and that the political and military movement to end that
régime was gaining strength. . . . It became perfectly clear from the mob violence and
disturbances in June and the evidences of the unpopularity of the Tinoco [R]égime,
that it was in a critical condition . . . .

....
The Royal Bank cannot here claim the benefit of the presumptions which might
obtain in favor of a bank receiving a deposit in regular course of business and paying it
out in the usual way . . . . The whole transaction here was full of irregularities. . . . The
case of the Royal Bank depends not on the mere form of the transaction but upon the
good faith of the bank in the payment of money for the real use of the Costa Rican
Government under the Tinoco [R]égime. It must make out its case of actual furnishing
of money to the government for its legitimate use. It has not done so. The bank knew
that this money was to be used by the retiring [P]resident . . . for his personal support
after he had taken refuge in a foreign country. . . .
The case of the money paid to the brother . . . is much the same. . . . To pay salaries for
four years in advance is a most unusual and absurd course of business. All the
circumstances should have advised the Royal Bank that this second draft, too, was for
personal and not for legitimate government purposes. It must have known that Jose
Joaquin Tinoco in the fall of his brother’s government, which was pending, could not
expect to represent the Costa Rican Government as its Minister to Italy for four years,
that the reasons given for the payment of the money were a mere pretense and that it
was only, as in the case of his brother Federico, an abstraction of the money from the
30
public treasury to support a refuge abroad.

Many commentators regard the reasoning of this decision as incorporating
the general principles of the doctrine of odious debt,31 as it is based on the
assertions that the citizens of Costa Rica did not consent to the loans and they
did not benefit from them, facts of which the lender was aware.

27. Id.
28. Id. at 377–78.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id. at 393–94.
31. See, e.g., Jeff King, Chapter One: The Doctrine of Odious Debt Under International Law:
Definition, Evidence and Issues Concerning Application, in CISDL WORKING PAPER: ADVANCING
THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 41–42 (2003); MICHALOWSKI, supra note 23, at 39; Buchheit, Gulati &
Thompson, supra note 13, at 1217–18.
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Despite these initial developments, the only formal statements of the
doctrine of odious debt remain those of academicians and lawyers. In 1927,
Alexander Sack, a scholar of international law, developed a characterization of
odious debt:
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to
strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, etc., this
debt is odious for the population of all the State.
This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of
the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power.
The reason these “odious” debts cannot be considered to encumber the territory of
the State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determine the
legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State must be incurred and
the funds from it employed for the needs and in the interests of the State.
“Odious” debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the creditors,
are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not compromise the latter—in the case
that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the government which incurs them—except
to the extent that real advantages were obtained from these debts. The creditors have
committed a hostile act with regard to the people; they can’t therefore expect that
nation freed from a despotic power assume the “odious” debts, which are the personal
debts of that power.
Even when a despotic power is replaced by another, no less despotic or any more
responsive to the will of the people, the “odious” debts of the eliminated power are
32
not any less their personal debts and are not obligations for the new power. . . .

This characterization of debts incurred by a dictatorial regime—to which the
citizens of the nation do not consent and from which they do not derive
benefits, all of which is known to the lenders at the time the debts are incurred
as the personal debts of the dictator, to be collected from that regime rather
than from the successor government of the nation—as “odious debts” remains
the foundation of all discussions of the doctrine of odious debt.
In formulating the doctrine, Professor Sack recognized that vagueness in the
definition used to distinguish odious debts from other sovereign debts would
provide a means for nations to default opportunistically on their debts. To avoid
this destabilizing effect on the markets for sovereign debt, he proposed that
claims to repudiate debts as odious be resolved in an international tribunal.
Specifically, he proposed that
(1) The new Government would have to prove and an international tribunal would
have to ascertain the following:
(a) That the needs which the former Government claimed in order to contract
the debt in question, were odious and clearly in contradiction to the interests of
the people of the entirety of the former State or a part thereof, and

32. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS
ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157–58 (1927), translated in
PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165–66 (1991).
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(b) That the creditors, at the moment of paying out the loan, were aware of its
odious purpose.
(2) Upon establishment of these two points, the creditors must then prove that the
funds for this loan were not utilized for odious purposes—harming the people of the
entire State or part of it—but for general or specific purposes of the State which do
33
not have the character of being odious.

Thus, according to Professor Sack, the determination of whether or not a
debt is odious first involves a demonstration by the new government seeking
relief from the obligation to repay a debt incurred by the prior regime that: the
debt did not benefit the citizens of the nation (and so did not have their
consent), and that the lender knew of the uses of the proceeds of the loan when
they were disbursed. The lender then has an opportunity to secure repayment
of the debt (or a portion of the debt) by showing that the proceeds (or a portion
of them) were used to fund projects that were beneficial to the citizens.
B. Adaptation of the Doctrine of Odious Debt
Following this period of activity, the doctrine of odious debt remained
fallow, seldom employed in negotiations between governments or examined in
the academy. Then, in the spring of 2003, the United States toppled the regime
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Estimates of the country’s foreign debt burden
ranged from $120 billion to $130 billion,34 rising to as high as $350 billion when
all claims incurred during the Hussein Regime were considered.35 Based on the
size of the burden and the brutality of the regime, many commentators,
including members of the Bush Administration, advocated that the new
government in Iraq disavow the debts incurred during the Hussein Regime.36 In
addition to discussions in the political sphere, these events and comments
invigorated the debate regarding the doctrine of odious debt among
academicians.37
33. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS
ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 163 (1927), translated in Robert
Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law 3 (U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev.,
Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf.
34. Ester Pan, Iraq: The Regime’s Debt, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 31, 2003), http://
www.cfr.org/publication/7796/iraq.html.
35. Paying for Saddam’s Sins: Should the New Iraq Honour the Financial Obligations of the Old
Regime?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 68.
36. See, e.g., Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts 1 (Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 526, 2004),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-526es.html; David DeRosa, Iraq Needs a New Currency
and Debt Relief, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (Apr. 2003) (quoting John Snow, U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, declaring “[c]ertainly the people of Iraq shouldn’t be saddled with those debts incurred
through the regime of the dictator who’s now gone”); but see Iraq’s Debt: The U.S. Should Beware the
Principle of Odious Lending, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 20.
37. See generally Hanlon, supra note 7; MICHALOWSKI, supra note 23; Buchheit, Gulati &
Thompson, supra note 13; Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004);
Feibelman, Contract, supra note 12; Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each
Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005) [hereinafter Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina]; Jayachandran &
Kremer, supra note 10; Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003,
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The work of scholars over the course of the past several years has
principally been devoted to designing alternative mechanisms for achieving the
aims of the odious debt doctrine.38 For example, several scholars have offered
adaptations of the doctrine that shift the locus of the inquiry from the loan-byloan analysis inherent in Professor Sack’s formulation to an examination of the
nature of the regime. Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer, for instance,
propose that international bodies—such as the United Nations Security
Council, as well as significant participants in the sovereign debt markets,
including the European Union and the United States—declare that any future
debt incurred by a particular dictator will be considered odious and therefore
illegitimate and nontransferable to successor regimes.39 A declaration of this
nature, they argue, would impose “loan sanctions” against the dictator by
limiting the incentives of creditors to make loans to the dictator.40
Similarly, Patrick Bolton and David Skeel propose that a regime be deemed
odious if the United Nations determines that it engages in systematic
suppression or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) determines that it
engages in systematic looting (or both).41 The United Nations would make its
declaration of odiousness based upon a finding of systematic suppression either
during the time that the regime was in power or upon the emergence of a new
government.42 In either case, the declaration would render the debts of the
regime unenforceable.43 The IMF, they argue, “could police a regime’s looting
by imposing conditions on access to IMF assistance as well as by invalidating
the regime’s debt.”44 Consequently, the sources of funds available to the regime
would be severely constrained.
Other scholars have worked to expand the scope of the investigation to
encompass dictatorial regimes, so that sovereign debts may be challenged as
odious debts even during the dictator’s reign. Christoph Paulus, for example,
identifies three conditions to the determination of a sovereign debt as odious:
“lack of consent on the part of the people, the loan not being in the interests of
the people, and the lender’s knowledge of the other two facts.”45 Either an
existing court institution, such as the Dispute Settlement Body of the World
at 39, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200311/stiglitz; Symposium, Odious Debts and
State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer & Autumn 2007).
38. A few scholars, however, have criticized the doctrine of odious debt. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi &
Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Summer
2007) (arguing that, while selective application of the doctrine may be beneficial in principle, achieving
the desired application is unlikely to be feasible in practice); Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note
37, at 393 (arguing that sovereign debtors in dire financial straits inhabit a relatively flexible universe,
with sufficient public, private, legal, and political resources to keep their creditors at bay).
39. Jayachandran and Kremer, supra note 10, at 82.
40. Id. at 90.
41. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 10, at 84–85.
42. Id. at 85.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Paulus, supra note 11, at 92.
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Trade Organization, or a new adjudicative body created by the United Nations
could be charged with enforcing this new legal principle.46 The parties permitted
to petition the international tribunal to hear claims that a regime’s debts are
odious would be specified through “an appropriate process which guarantees
access to the panel in cases of ‘odious debts’ without imposing an unbearable
control mechanism on the parties involved.”47 Upon a favorable finding, each
sovereign debt considered in the hearing would be declared null and void, and
the creditor would be precluded from demanding repayment on the grounds of
unjust enrichment.48
Proposing the application of a similar approach in a different context, Adam
Feibelman seeks to develop a “contractual odious debt mechanism” through
which a sovereign debtor expressly promises its creditors that it will refrain
from incurring odious debts.49 The sovereign debtor also “promise[s] each
creditor that it will inform subsequent creditors of the contractual arrangement
and that it will make similar arrangements with these creditors.”50 The contract
governing the loan will define the characteristics of an odious debt, and it will
grant a majority, or a supermajority, of the creditors the authority to designate
obligations of the debtor as odious in accordance with the contractual
definition.51 If an obligation is deemed to be odious, the sovereign debtor will be
required to repudiate it.52
Finally, rather than proposing the development of new frameworks for
designating regimes as odious or the inclusion of new terms in the agreements
governing sovereign debt, other scholars have investigated the extent to which
the aims of the doctrine of odious debt may be achieved through the application
of principles of private (domestic) law to sovereign debts. In particular, they
examine the extent to which common-law principles of contract, tort, and
lender liability, as well as fundamental principles of insolvency, might provide a
successful defense for a new government that is sued for failure to make
payments on an odious debt incurred during the prior reign of a despot. For
example, Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson argue that
whenever the odious debt involves a bribe, the new government should be able
to assert (and would likely be successful in its assertion) that enforcement of the
payment obligations related to the debt would be contrary to the public policy
of the United States and its constituent states.53 Similarly, these scholars posit
that, in the event the dictator stole the proceeds of the loan, the new
government should be able to assert (and would likely be successful in its

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 100.
Feibelman, Contract, supra note 12, at 748.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 13, at 1232–35.
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assertion) that the lender has “unclean hands” and so is not entitled to
payment.54
Working within the framework of tort law, Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu
Gulati offer a means of apportioning the losses associated with an odious debt.55
Specifically, they propose that upon a suit for failure to make payments on an
odious debt, the sovereign debtor should be entitled to assert a defense of
contributory negligence.56 To the extent the new government is able to show
that the lender was at fault, the portion of the debt that was not used for the
benefit of the country’s citizens would be discharged. For example, if the
proceeds of the loan were deposited into a personal account of the dictator,
then the entire debt would be discharged. If only a portion of the proceeds of
the loan was used to pay a bribe to the dictator, then only that portion of the
debt would be discharged. Professor Ben-Shahar and Professor Gulati note that
they are, in effect, proposing a comparative-fault scheme for odious debts—one
that is applicable not only to disputes between the new government and each of
its creditors, but also to disputes among the creditors because those creditors
who are less at fault would be able to secure greater payments on the debts
owed to them.57
To address disputes among creditors, Professor Feibelman draws upon the
doctrines of lender liability, particularly equitable subornation and fraudulent
transfer.58 He argues that the creditors of a sovereign debtor should be able to
employ these doctrines to subordinate or avoid odious debts that the sovereign
owes to other creditors pursuant to state law in federal district courts or state
courts in the United States.59 By providing creditors with a means to reduce (or
to eliminate) the likelihood that a creditor acting opportunistically or
fraudulently will be entitled to payment in respect of its debt, these doctrines
provide incentives for creditors to monitor one another, particularly with
respect to the incurrence of odious debts.60
Mechele Dickerson relies upon fundamental principles of insolvency to
achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debt. In particular, she argues that
the core “business” of a new government is to “protect the safety and provide
for the general welfare of its citizens.”61 Thus, it is consistent with general
insolvency principles to allow a new government, encumbered with enormous
debts that provided little (or no) benefits to the citizens of the country, to

54. Id. at 1235–37.
55. See generally Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 13.
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 65.
58. See generally Feibelman, supra note 13.
59. Id. at 179 (noting that asserting these doctrines under bankruptcy law is unavailable because
sovereigns cannot file for bankruptcy under U.S. bankruptcy law).
60. Id. at 189.
61. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 72.
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repudiate those debts if repaying them would render the government
functionally insolvent and unable to perform its critical functions.62
Over the course of the more than one hundred years during which the
doctrine of odious debt was initially developed and then recently adapted, the
nature of international lending has changed dramatically. At the time of the
Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Tinoco Arbitration in 1923, and
continuing until the middle of the 1940s, sovereign debtors borrowed funds
almost exclusively from investors who purchased sovereign bonds.63 Beginning
in the Cold War, sovereign debtors procured loans from other governments64 as
well as from the international financial institutions, notably the World Bank.65
During the 1970s, sovereign debtors borrowed funds from commercial banks.66
These loans were securitized and converted into bonds (known as Brady bonds)
during the 1990s.67 As a result of these transitions—from bonds to bilateral loans
and multilateral loans, to commercial-bank loans, and then again to bonds—as
well as the continuing role of private lenders, international financial institutions,
and governments in providing credit to sovereigns, the international financial
architecture is comprised of distinct creditors with diverse interests.68
To be sure, the extent of involvement of any of these creditors in lending to
sovereigns fluctuates over time. In addition, the particular mix of debt—
sovereign bonds, commercial-bank loans, multilateral loans from the
international financial institutions, and bilateral loans from other
governments—varies from sovereign debtor to sovereign debtor. Nonetheless,
each of these creditors and each of these types of debt are present in the
international financial architecture. An analysis of the odious debt doctrine, as
well as of the recent adaptations of the doctrine, then, requires an
understanding of the nature of the salient features of each type of sovereign
debt.

62. Id.
63. Vinod K. Aggarwal, The Evolution of Debt Crisis: Origins, Management and Policy Lessons, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 11, 13 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte
Granville eds., 2003); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1051–53 (2004).
64. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 87 (Summer 2007)
[hereinafter Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt].
65. Aggarwal, supra note 63, at 14.
66. James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 202–03 (Autumn 2007).
67. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1067.
68. Id. at 1070–71; Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1115–16 (2004).
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III
THE ELEMENTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
A. Bilateral Loans
As tensions during the Cold War escalated, the government of the United
States, as well as the government of the Soviet Union, began to provide
financing to governments to advance strategic objectives. These new programs
had a variety of goals ranging from the improvement of military capabilities to
economic development to humanitarian assistance.69 The enactment of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,70 together with the founding of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID),71 comprised a comprehensive foreignassistance program. Through this program, Congress has authorized myriad
foreign loan initiatives related to the spread of democracy, the growth of
exports, the reduction of poverty, and the eradication of disease.
The primary form of assistance from the United States was, and remains,
loans.72 Yet, in many instances, the government does not expect that the loans
will be repaid. Rather than enforcing the payment provisions, a portion (or all)
of the loans is often forgiven or converted to a grant.73
In the event the bilateral loans must be restructured, the work is conducted
through the Paris Club, an informal group of nineteen creditor governments
from the major industrialized countries.74 Representatives of these countries
meet monthly in Paris to assist sovereign debtors in restructuring their debts.75
Agreements between the governmental lenders and the sovereign debtors are
typically reached quickly and inexpensively because the governments are
willing to make concessions based on geopolitical, rather than financial,
considerations.76
These arrangements, of course, arise from the nature of bilateral loans.
These types of loans are, in essence, political accommodations rather than
economic transactions. In making a loan to an ally, the United States (like all
creditor countries) is concerned with achieving its tactical goals—such as

69. Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, supra note 64, at 94.
70. Act for International Development of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87195, § 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2311).
71. See About USAID, USAID, http://www.usaid/gov/about_usaid/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
72. Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, supra note 64, at 95.
73. Id.
74. See THE PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
75. Paris Club Meetings, THE PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/
fonctionnement-du-club/reunions (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
76. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53
EMORY L.J. 997, 1008–09 (2006).

GENTILE

164

1/11/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:151

influencing the ally’s policies—not with generating additional revenues for the
public fisc. Consequently, loans are often made to dictatorships.77
B. Multilateral Loans
The IMF, with nearly two hundred members, was established in 194578 to
promote international monetary cooperation and exchange stability, to foster
economic growth, and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries
that are experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties.79 The principal means by
which the IMF works to achieve these goals is multilateral loans,80 financed with
funds provided by its members.81 The terms and conditions of these loans, which
typically include stipulations regarding specific economic policies to be
implemented,82 are the subject of negotiation between the IMF and the member
country requesting the loan.83
Over the course of the half-century since its creation, and in response to
changes in the international financial architecture, the IMF has altered its
rationale for making loans to sovereigns.84 Rather than assisting countries in
resolving temporary difficulties in their current account payments, the efforts of
the IMF have shifted to promoting economic development and managing
restructurings of sovereign debt.85 Specifically, IMF loans are now designed (1)
to assist countries in adjusting to shocks caused by a variety of events, including
changes in the terms of trade and national disasters, as a means of avoiding
severe economic disruptions and costly defaults on sovereign debts, (2) to
provide a catalyst for other lenders, particularly commercial banks and
investors, to extend credit to countries experiencing disruptions and
restructurings, and (3) to prevent capital account crises.86
In addition to these concerns for economic development, multilateral loans
often entail political considerations. For example, Strom Thacker has
demonstrated that the United States, which controls the largest portion of the

77. Indeed, Professor Choi and Professor Posner suggest that cooperation with dictatorships is
more common than sanctioning them. Choi & Posner, supra note 38, at 33.
78. The IMF at a Glance, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/glance.htm [hereinafter IMF at a Glance].
79. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND art. I–Purposes,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/.
80. Yilmaz Akyűz, Rectifying Capital Market Imperfections: The Continuing Rational for
Multilateral Lending, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 486, 486
(Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceiçáo eds., 2006).
81. IMF at a Glance, supra note 78.
82. Lending by the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Lending by the IMF].
83. Factsheet: IMF Lending, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.
84. Lending by the IMF, supra note 82.
85. Akyűz, supra note 80, at 492–94.
86. Lending by the IMF, supra note 82.
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voting power in the IMF,87 favors granting loans to countries that serve as allies,
particularly in their respective voting patterns on matters presented in the
United Nations General Assembly.88 Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen have
shown that loans made to countries voting with the United States in the United
Nations General Assembly have fewer conditions than those made to countries
that are not allied with the United States in this way.89
Multilateral loans thus share important characteristics with bilateral loans.
They are designed to achieve specific objectives—protecting and strengthening
the international financial architecture—not to earn profits for the IMF.
Decisions to extend credit as well as determinations of the applicable
prerequisites for receiving credit are influenced by efforts to advance political
aims. Finally, restructurings of these loans involve a dialogue between the IMF
and the relevant sovereign debtor, and so are seldom time consuming or costly.
C. Private Loans
1. Commercial Loans
Commercial banks make loans to sovereigns through lending syndicates.90
Each syndicate is organized by a large, international commercial bank that
serves as the manager of the syndicate.91 The managing bank advises the
sovereign of market conditions, principally the terms on which it expects to be
able to obtain commitments from a sufficient number of commercial banks to
satisfy the sovereign’s borrowing needs.92 The manager also negotiates, on
behalf of the syndicate, the terms of the loan agreement with the sovereign.93 To
complete the syndication process, the managing bank prepares, in conjunction
with the sovereign, an information memorandum describing the sovereign’s
financial condition and the loan terms.94 The manager then secures the
commitments of the banks participating in the syndicate, and it arranges for the
funds to be disbursed to the sovereign debtor.95
Restructurings of commercial loans are accomplished through the London
Club, a collection of informal arrangements including the use of bank advisory

87. Strom C. Thacker, The High Politics of IMF Lending, 52 WORLD POL. 38, 41 (1999).
88. Id. at 67–69.
89. Axel Dreher & Nathan M. Jensen, Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the
Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions, 50 J.L. & ECON. 105, 121 (2007).
90. JOHN D. FINNERTY & DOUGLAS R. EMERY, DEBT MANAGEMENT: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 31–32 (2001).
91. Leo Clarke & Stanley F. Farrar, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated
Loans to Government Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 229 (1982).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 233. See also International Banking Survey, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982.
94. Clarke & Farrar, supra note 91, at 233.
95. Id. at 244–45.
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committees and standard processes for negotiating with sovereign debtors.96 The
terms of each restructuring are, in large measure, influenced by the IMF, which
requires the commercial banks in the lending syndicate to make new loans to
the sovereign debtor as a condition to the extension of multilateral credit.97 In
many instances, the U.S. government also plays a significant role in the
negotiations, counseling (and pressuring) both members of the bank advisory
committees and representatives of the sovereign debtor.98
Although the work of the London Club proceeds slowly—requiring, in some
cases, years to complete the restructuring of a sovereign debtor’s commercial
loans—the informal processes tend to be effective.99 Commercial banks are
typically reluctant to disavow the work of the London Club by declaring a
default and accelerating their loans because there are few advantages and
significant disadvantages. Upon the declaration of a default on a loan in its
portfolio, a commercial bank is required, pursuant to applicable regulations, to
increase its loan-loss reserves or write off a portion of the loan.100 Both of these
actions diminish the commercial bank’s financial condition. Moreover, rejection
of a restructuring proposed through the London Club would jeopardize, for the
commercial bank serving as the manager of the lending syndicate, important
business relationships with the sovereign debtor101 and, for small, regional
commercial banks participating in the lending syndicate, vital banking
relationships with the managing bank.102
Unlike bilateral loans and multilateral loans, commercial loans are, to a
significant degree, subject to market forces. Commercial banks must operate
profitably to remain in business. In determining whether to enforce the right to
repayment of a loan against a sovereign debtor or to accept the partial payment
to be made as part of a proposed restructuring of the loan, commercial banks
weigh the likely impact of each course of action on revenues and expenses. Due
to the high regulatory costs and the impairment of crucial relationships caused
by the declaration of an event of default, commercial banks acquiesce to the
demands of the London Club.

96. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1055–63; Daniel McGovern, Different Market Windows
on Sovereign Debt: Private-Sector Credit from the 1980s to the Present, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS,
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 69, 82–83 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003).
97. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1061–62. The extension of multilateral credit, of course, is
necessary for the sovereign to resolve the financial crisis giving rise to the restructuring and to resume
payments on its debts.
98. See Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Debt: A Change of Hat, INT’L FIN. L. REV., June 1990, at 12
(describing the conflicting roles of the U.S. government in restructurings of sovereign commercial
loans).
99. McGovern, supra note 96, at 82–83.
100. Clarke & Farrar, supra note 91, at 232.
101. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1058–59.
102. See id. at 1060–61.
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2. Sovereign Bonds
Sovereign bonds are sold in the capital markets, including the domestic
market in the United States and the international Eurobond market.103 The
investors purchasing an issue of sovereign bonds may be citizens of the issuer or
other countries, as well as financial institutions or single individuals.104 They
include commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, mutual funds, and purchasers in the retail sector.105
These diverse purchasers differ in their investment strategies, in the
regulations to which they are subject, and in the nature of their relationships
with sovereign debtors.106 Furthermore, they purchase their sovereign bonds at
different prices, as bonds in the secondary market often trade at deep discounts
to their face values.107 Vulture funds, notably, trade in distressed debt, including
sovereign bonds. These investors seek short-term gains by purchasing the debt
of troubled issuers for pennies on the dollar and then, once a violation of the
terms of the bonds occurs, seek to enforce their rights (including, when
applicable, the right to the repayment of the full value of the debt) through
litigation.108
Restructurings of sovereign bonds take place in the capital markets through
exchange offers.109 In these transactions, sovereign debtors propose to replace
existing bonds with alternative bonds that reschedule or reduce the payments
owed under the original bonds.110 Rather than negotiating directly with the
creditors, or with an advisory committee following standard processes,
sovereign debtors consult with groups of financial institutions holding large
positions in the bonds, and they also meet individually with these investors.111
103. Michael G. Kollo, Underwriter Competition and Gross Spreads in the Eurobond Market 9 (Eur.
Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 550, 2005), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/
ecbwp550.pdf. See also INT’L MONETARY FUND, ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET FOR
FIRST-TIME SOVEREIGN ISSUERS 16, 20 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/icm/2003/eng/
111703.pdf (describing factors for consideration in selection of market for issuance of sovereign bonds).
104. McGovern, supra note 96, at 77.
105. Id. See also Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, INT’L FIN. L. REV.,
Dec. 2000, at 17, 18 [hereinafter Buchheit, Bond Trap] (describing diversity among holders of
Ecuador’s Brady bonds); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay’s Innovations, 2004 J. INT’L
BUS. L. REV. 28, 28 [hereinafter Buchheit, Innovations] (noting fragmented and dispersed holders of
sovereign bonds).
106. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1071–74.
107. See Buchheit, Bond Trap, supra note 105, at 18 (noting discounts in secondary markets for
Ecuador’s Brady bonds).
108. For a discussion of the role of vulture funds in sovereign debt restructurings, see Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 63, at 1071–72, 1088–90.
109. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA. L.
REV. 59, 60 (2000).
110. Id. at 60, 62–64.
111. See, e.g., Buchheit, Bond Trap, supra note 105, at 18 (describing the restructuring process for
Ecuador’s Brady bonds); Buchheit, Innovations, supra note 105, at 28–29 (describing the restructuring
process for Uruguay’s bonds); Anna Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, INT’L
FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, at 19, 20–21 [hereinafter, Gelpern, Bond Markets] (describing the restructuring
process for Argentina’s bonds).
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This consultative process is designed to allow sovereign debtors to determine
the restructuring terms that are likely to be acceptable to all (or nearly all)
investors.112
The diversity of investors and the heterogeneity of their interests make this
task impossibly difficult.113 Additionally, some investors, namely vulture funds,
pursue a strategy of rejecting exchange offers and seeking preferential
treatment in court. This holdout litigation, while often beneficial for the vulture
funds, disrupts the restructuring process, causing delays and inflicting losses on
the sovereign debtor and the other creditors.114 Efforts to preclude, or constrain,
these types of suits against sovereign debtors115 have not been entirely
successful,116 and this litigation remains a persistent characteristic of
restructurings of sovereign bonds.
IV
LIMITING ODIOUS CREDIT
Recent efforts to adapt the doctrine of odious debt to shift the onus of
limiting the harms a dictator inflicts on the citizenry from new governments to
creditors are an essential component of the modern legal history of sovereign
debt. Recognizing the reluctance of new governments to employ the doctrine to
repudiate debts incurred by despots, these proposals seek to raise the costs of
extending credit to dictators and thereby reduce incentives to lend. Yet, many
creditors have motivations other than profit in making loans to sovereigns and
so are unlikely to alter their behavior upon the implementation of these plans.
And, some of the creditors that are motivated by financial gain are likely to find
the profitable course of action to be to accept short-term losses in order to
secure long-term gains.
In making bilateral loans, the U.S. government (like other creditor
governments) seeks to advance its strategic objectives, and so it agrees to
restructure its loans to sovereigns to achieve tactical goals. Similarly, the IMF,
in making and in agreeing to restructure multilateral loans, seeks to achieve
specific objectives regarding the soundness of the international financial
architecture and, in many instances, to advance partisan interests. Moreover,
commercial banks, although subject to market forces in making loans to
112. Buchheit, Innovations, supra note 105, at 29 (noting the purpose of consultations in the
restructuring process for Uruguay’s bonds).
113. See Felix Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837, 838 (2007)
(describing discrimination against retail investors in sovereign bond restructurings).
114. G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 637–38 (2001).
115. For a description of these efforts, see Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1090–97.
116. Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their
Antidotes: Lessons From the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 295 (2010). See, e.g.,
Gelpern, Bond Markets, supra note 111, at 21 (noting judgments received through holdout litigation in
restructuring of Argentina’s bonds); Ashley Seager & James Lewis, How “Vulture Funds” Prey on
Poor Nations, THE HINDU, Oct. 19, 2007, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/2007/10/19/stories/
2007101954771300.htm.
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sovereigns, maximize revenues and minimize expenses by agreeing to
restructuring terms that reflect political pressures and impulses to protect
valuable relationships.
Investors, however, base their decisions to purchase and to agree to
restructure sovereign bonds upon financial considerations. These calculations
include the profit to be earned by purchasing sovereign bonds in the secondary
market for a fraction of their face values and enforcing payment of the entire
amount owed on the bonds in court. This inclination of vulture funds to pursue
opportunistic litigation may be harnessed to limit the credit available to
dictators.
A. Uses of Proceeds and Covenants
To sell bonds in the capital markets, sovereigns must provide investors with
extensive information regarding their financial condition and the terms of the
bonds. As Lee Buchheit has noted,
Borrowers face a cruel choice: tell or pay. The finest pricing terms for a debt
obligation are usually available only for instruments that have a significant degree of
liquidity ([i.e.,] instruments that can be readily sold or resold to a broad range of
investors). But the securities laws of most jurisdictions say that a borrower which
issues its debt instruments to a broad range of investors should disclose a good deal of
information about itself, its business and its financial condition to the prospective
purchasers of those instruments. Thus, a disclosure-averse borrower may be consigned
to raising funds through commercial bank loans . . . ; borrowings that typically
command some premium in terms of pricing in comparison with publicly-issued debt
117
instruments.

In describing the market practice regarding issuances of sovereign bonds,
Mr. Buchheit states that sovereigns “generally provide . . . information about
their country, its history and political situation, foreign relations, economic and
financial information including balance of payments, balance of trade and
exchange rate policies, and external debt service statistics.”118 With respect to
the agreements governing the bonds, Stephen Choi and Professor Gulati
examined the information provided by ten sovereigns issuing bonds from 1985
to 2005.119 They found that an explicit change in the actual contract language
relating to the individual rights of holders of the bonds during a restructuring of
the bonds was disclosed prominently, and continued to be disclosed
prominently almost two years after the change in terms became widely known
in the market, by all but one of the sovereigns.120
Moreover, sovereigns issuing bonds in the U.S. market must comply with
the disclosure requirements of Schedule B to the Securities Act of 1933.121 These

117. Lee C. Buchheit, The Schedule B Alternative, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1992, at 6, 6.
118. Id.
119. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practice, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1023 (2006).
120. Id. at 1025, 1032–33, 1051–52, 1062.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2009).
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requirements include information regarding the “specific purposes in detail and
the approximate amounts to be devoted to such purposes, so far as
determinable, for which the security to be offered is to supply funds . . . .”122
Rather than merely identifying the purposes for which the proceeds are to
be used, sovereign debtors could promise to apply the funds in the manner
specified. In effect, the description in the offering document for the bonds
would be repeated as a covenant in the agreement governing the bonds. So, if
the disclosed uses of the proceeds were to build hospitals and schools in rural
areas, then the governing agreement would contain a covenant that the
sovereign debtor will use the proceeds of the bonds to build hospitals and
schools in rural areas.123 In addition to promising to use the sale proceeds in a
specified manner, sovereign debtors could also covenant to use the proceeds
from all subsequent incurrences of debt for similar purposes that benefit the
citizenry.124
Incorporating a covenant regarding the uses of the proceeds from an
issuance of sovereign bonds into the agreement governing the bonds would
provide investors with a way to restrict the ability of dictators to use borrowed
funds for purposes that have deleterious effects on the citizenry.125 Were a
sovereign debtor to breach the covenant, the investors would have the right to
accelerate the amount owed on the bonds, including the principal, making the
debt due immediately, rather than on the maturity date of the bonds.126 The
exigencies of immediate repayment would severely constrain the funds
available to the dictator.
Investors are likely to be able to obtain information regarding covenant
breaches. Funds borrowed to finance projects that are beneficial for the
citizenry typically involve large-scale public works, such as infrastructure
development through the construction of power plants, waterways, sewage
plants, and roads, and community development through building hospitals and
schools. The results of these types of projects—utilities, dams and reservoirs,
122. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2009).
123. This approach is similar to the treatment of the payment terms of the bonds. Every offering
document for an issue of sovereign bonds contains a description of the amounts to be paid (principal
and interest) as well as the method of payment (the applicable paying agent and the means by which
the amounts paid are to be distributed to the holders of the bonds). And, the underlying governing
agreement contains a covenant to pay the principal and interest on the bonds using the paying agent
and means described in the offering document.
124. Recall that Professor Dickerson describes the core business of government as protecting the
safety and providing for the general welfare of its citizens. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 72. This
proposed covenant, then, may be viewed as analogous to business continuation covenants in
agreements governing corporate bonds. Through a covenant of this type, a corporate debtor promises
to remain in the same line of business as the one it is operating in on the date the bonds are issued.
125. Remedies for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws are limited to
damages. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: ESSENTIALS 102–03
(2008).
126. For a description of the workings of acceleration clauses in agreements governing sovereign
bonds, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Soveriegn Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J.
1317, 1330–32 (2002).
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waste treatment facilities, highways, and sizable buildings—are easily observed
by investors.
Moreover, vulture funds, like all hedge funds, regularly engage specialist
research firms to provide them with detailed information regarding their
investments.127 Each consultant employed by these firms has extensive
experience in the industry with respect to which research services are provided,
as well as access to information that is not widely available in the capital
markets. Upon the adoption of use-of-proceeds covenants in agreements
governing sovereign bonds, specialist research firms can be expected to expand
the areas and events they cover to encompass the progress on, and completion
of, the public-works projects promised to be funded with the proceeds from
issuances of sovereign bonds.128 Similarly, the credit rating agencies are likely to
expand their analyses of the creditworthiness of sovereign debtors to include,
for each country, a review of compliance with the use-of-proceeds covenants in
the agreements governing its sovereign bonds.129 Finally, as Professor Gulati and
George Triantis have explained, the IMF serves as a delegated monitor in the
sovereign debt context, bearing responsibility for scrutinizing the actions of
sovereign debtors.130 This scrutiny includes monitoring “economic performance,
debt burdens and servicing strategies, and macro economic policies. Its staff
conducts site visits, prepares country reports, and provides expert assistance to
help members address debt servicing or macro economic challenges.”131
Through this work, the IMF will promptly uncover evidence of failures to
comply with use-of-proceeds covenants, and it can be expected to share this
information with investors.
Investors are likely to favor the incorporation of covenants regarding uses of
proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds. For vulture funds, these
covenants would provide an additional opportunity to pursue their strategy of
seeking, through litigation, preferential treatment for repayment of sovereign
bonds purchased in the secondary market. Other investors are also likely to
value the protection the covenants would provide against efforts of sovereign
debtors to restructure their bonds on advantageous terms. For example, Mr.
Buchheit and Professor Gulati describe the conduct of President Correa as:
[l]acking a financial justification for demanding concessions from the country’s
creditors, the Correa administration decided that it would seek a legal pretext for its
hostile debt policy. The slogans for this were lying conveniently at hand courtesy of

127. See Laurie P. Cohen, Seeking an Edge, Big Investors Turn to Network of Informants, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A1 (describing role of independent research firms in providing hedge funds with
access to industry experts).
128. Id. (describing the fee structure and revenues of independent research firms).
129. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, CREDIT ANALYSIS: ECUADOR 1, 5 (Mar. 2010)
(describing primary factors determining bond rating range for sovereign debtors as including
susceptibility to event risk).
130. Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 991–92 (2007).
131. Id. at 993.
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the academic debate about the early twentieth century doctrine of odious sovereign
debts . . . .
Shortly after taking office in 2006, Correa appointed a Commission of Integral Audit
of Public Credit and ordered it to examine Ecuador’s foreign debts. That Commission,
composed principally of local and foreign activists for third-world debt cancellation,
duly reported its finding that virtually all of Ecuador’s external debt stock was fatally
132
tainted by illegality and illegitimacy.

If the agreements governing Ecuador’s sovereign bonds had contained use-ofproceeds covenants, these actions would have resulted in restructuring terms
that were disadvantageous to the country, as claims that its debt negotiators
were wicked and corrupt would have provided a basis for investors to assert
claims of breach of covenant, which would have strengthened their negotiating
position. Finally, some investors may view the covenants as an effective means
of limiting the credit available to dictators, and they may value those
constraints. In describing the significant degree of debt relief granted to heavily
indebted sovereigns, Mr. Buchheit and Professor Gulati note that
[n]o one will ever be able to determine how much of the relief granted to these
countries was attributable to the creditors’ own sense of culpability for having lent
money, or at least so much money, in the first place. But this was surely an element in
133
the deals cut for certain countries such as Iraq in 2004.

Sovereign debtors are unlikely to resist efforts to incorporate covenants
regarding uses of proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds. Indeed,
they can be expected to support these efforts. Michael Bradley, James Cox, and
Professor Gulati “find that sovereign bond pricing is sensitive to changes in
legal risk posed by . . . bond covenants.”134 Thus, the more protections the
agreement governing the bonds provides to investors, the lower the interest rate
investors demand to purchase the bonds (because the bonds are subject to less
risk). By including a use-of-proceeds covenant in the agreement governing an
issue of its bonds, then, a sovereign debtor can obtain a lower interest rate on
the bonds, thereby reducing the cost of the financing. The reduction in
financing costs provides strong incentives to incorporate covenants regarding
uses of proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds.
B. Covenants and Capital Markets
The terms of any covenant regarding the use of the proceeds from any
issuance of sovereign bonds will be familiar to investors and sovereign debtors.
Indeed, these terms will be drawn from the capital markets. In preparing a
covenant for inclusion in the agreement governing an issue of sovereign bonds,
a sovereign debtor will review the offering documents used to market issuances
of the sovereign debtor’s bonds in the past, as well as the offering documents
for issuances of bonds of similar countries with comparable financing needs.
132. Buchheit & Gulati, Coroner’s Inquest, supra note 2, at 23.
133. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debts and Nation-Building: When the Incubus
Departs, 60 ME. L. REV. 477, 485 (2008).
134. Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 116, at 302.
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The sovereign debtor will also review the planned uses for the funds to be
obtained upon issuance of the bonds. As a consequence of this process, the
description of the uses of the proceeds in the offering document and the related
terms of the use-of-proceeds covenant in the governing agreement135 will be
both in a standard form and tailored to reflect the intentions of the sovereign
debtor.136 Moreover, by incorporating the description of the uses of the proceeds
in the offering document into a covenant made in the agreement governing the
bonds, the sovereign debtor grants investors the right to accelerate the amount
owed on the bonds in the event the proceeds are not used as promised in the
covenant (and described in the offering document).
As a result, adapting existing disclosure requirements and market practices
to incorporate a covenant regarding the use of proceeds from an issuance of
sovereign bonds into the agreement governing the bonds is unlikely to disrupt
the capital markets. Rather than introducing new adjudicative procedures and
seeking to develop new contractual mechanisms, this approach uses existing
terms and exploits extant incentives toward litigation to provide a means of
limiting the credit available to dictators.
This approach, however, is not without limitations. Although both investors
and sovereign debtors have strong incentives to include covenants limiting the
uses of the proceeds from issuances of sovereign bonds in the agreements
governing the bonds, we cannot be sure that the agreements will be modified in
this way. Agreements governing sovereign bonds can be characterized as highly
standardized, and they are generally very difficult to modify, even in the face of
sustained pressure from governmental officials.137
Moreover, even if agreements governing sovereign bonds were modified to
include use-of-proceeds covenants, they would serve to constrain only sovereign
debtors that issue bonds. Countries that obtain their external financing (or even
a substantial portion of their external financing) through bilateral loans and
multilateral loans will not be subject to pressures from investors. Indeed, even
countries that borrow extensively from other private creditors, like commercial
banks, will not be severely constrained in using the proceeds of the loans in
ways that do not benefit the citizenry.
Furthermore, even sovereigns that obtain all (or a substantial portion of)
their external financing through issuances of bonds governed by agreements
containing covenants limiting the uses of the proceeds from the bonds may be
able to finance undertakings that are detrimental to their citizens. Money, of
course, is fungible. So, if funds from the issuance of the bonds cannot be used in
ways that are detrimental to the interests of the country’s citizens, tax revenues

135. The disclosure in the offering document and the terms of the covenant will be identical, with
the exception that the disclosure takes the form of a description and the covenant makes a promise.
136. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond
Contracts Since 2003, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 85, 90, 100 (describing variations in standard terms of
sovereign bonds).
137. Id. at 85, 87.
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will be available for these purposes. Good reasons exist, however, to conclude
that opportunities to engage in this type of substitution may be limited.138
V
CONCLUSION
The exploration—by governmental officials, participants in the capital
markets, lawyers, and academicians—of the doctrine of odious debt remains an
enduring hallmark of the modern legal history of sovereign debt. In seeking to
adapt the odious debt doctrine to serve as a means of reducing the incentives of
creditors to make loans to dictators, this work has embraced myriad
approaches. One method of analysis shifts the focus of the inquiry from
individual extensions of credit to entire regimes, proposing to designate an
international adjudicative forum as responsible for identifying despots against
whom debts will not be enforced. Another analytical approach extends the time
of the inquiry from the period following the overthrow of the dictator to include
the period of his reign, relying on an international tribunal or the enforcement
of new terms in commercial bank loans to identify the debts that sovereign
debtors must repudiate. A final method of analysis retains the focus on the
debts of the sovereign in the aftermath of the dictatorial regime that is inherent
in the odious debt doctrine and proposes to use common-law principles of
contract, tort, and lender liability—as well as fundamental principles of
insolvency—to craft successful defenses against claims for payment upon
repudiation of the debts incurred by the despot. As a practical matter, each of
these proposed adaptations may prove difficult to implement.
A more effective approach may be to incorporate existing disclosure
requirements and market practices into the terms of the agreements governing
sovereign bonds. Adopting a covenant regarding the use of the proceeds from
an issuance of bonds and subsequent incurrences of debt would provide
investors with a direct means—by accelerating the amount owed on the bonds
upon a breach of the covenant—of limiting the credit available to dictators. This
approach, moreover, is likely to be favored by both investors and sovereign
debtors. Finally, in providing only greater enforcement rights for terms that are
part of all issuances of sovereign bonds, this approach is unlikely to disrupt the
capital markets.

138. Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 13, at 65–70.

